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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
TODD DEVEREAUX, 
Respondent/Appellee 
vs. 
SHERYL DEVEREAUX, 
Petitioner/Appellant 
: Case No. 20050709 
JURISDICITON OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated 78-2-2(3)() regarding an Order to Show Cause decision July 21, 
2005. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Whether the court made an error of law and fact when it reinterpreted a prior court ruling; 
and, whether the court made an error of law when it violated its jurisdiction by overruling 
a prior decision on the same matters. This court will find upon review that the ruling 
should be reversed because the findings and conclusions are do to, or colored by an error 
or misconception of the law [Clotworthy v. Clyde, 265 P. 2d 420, 1 Utah 2d 251; Cole v. 
Christopher, 217 P.2d 620, 121 Colo. 461; Rose v. Campitello, 159 A. 887,114 Conn. 
637, others in addendum]. 
Whether the evidence presented was sufficient to sustain a judgment of the court against 
Sheryl Devereaux for past child support and medical bills pursuant to Utah Code 78-45-7, 
and 78-45-7.15. This court will conclude after reviewing the evidence that the findings 
were the result of conflicting evidence that was plainly wrong and erroneous Vecki v. 
Sorensen, 273 P.2d 908,127 C.A. 2d 407. This court will conclude after reviewing the 
evidence that the finding was the result of passion, prejudice, bias or other improper 
motive or mistake Cardinal v. Cardinal, Civ.App., 131 S.W.2d 1005, error dismissed. 
[Other cases cited in full in addendum.] 
Whether the court made other errors of fact or law when it ignored the statements of an 
officer of the court, and other facts, or laws when it came to its findings and judgment to 
appellant, Sheryl Devereaux. This court will find upon review of the records that the 
court made clear error in its facts and case law surrounding this matter that were clearly, 
plainly, and manifestly wrong or erroneous, [Hancock v. 
Planned Development Corp., 791P.2d 183, Utah], and clearly unjust [Heifetz v. Bell, 225 
P.2d 231, 101 C.A.2d 275, and others in addendum]. This court will find upon review of 
the record and facts surrounding this matter that the judgment to Sheryl Devereaux shall 
be overturned because the judgment was clearly wrong and erroneous [Lemon v. Coates, 
735 P.2d 58; others in addendum]. 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Controlling statutory or constitutional provisions are set forth in the Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Sheryl Devereaux appeals from the judgment and order of the Fourth District 
Court, entered July 21, 2005, wherein she was ordered to pay past child support and 
medical bills; and an order dated September 9,2005 for attorney's fees all as per Utah 
Code 78-45-7. 
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B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
On April 16,1997 a decree of divorce was entered. Custody of the five minor 
children was awarded to the Petitioner, Sheryl Devereaux. Child support and alimony 
were agreed upon and stipulated by the parties without reference of the statutory 
guidelines as $1,900.00 and $1,500.00 respectively. 
On November 29,1999 an amended decree was filed wherein the 
respondent/appellee, would have physical custody of the five minor children. Alimony 
continued to Sheryl Devereaux, petitioner/appellant as $1,500.00. The Memorandum 
Decision from the court gave no directive regarding child support, nor was there any 
discussion of child support in the hearing. However, the Order made reference to child 
support to be determined in the future. 
On November 11,2000 Don Petersen, on behalf of Todd Devereaux, respondent, 
filed an Order to Show Cause for child support. Sheryl Devereaux retained Rose 
Blakelock, who filed a motion for Amendment of the Order of November 29,1999 Nunc 
Pro Tunc to comply with the Memorandum Decision which did not specify child support. 
Motions were eventually denied and on January 4, 2001, an Order to Show Cause hearing 
for child support was held. 
On February 25,2002 an order stipulating that petitioner/appellant pay child 
support based upon minimum wage was entered. Child support for the five minor 
children was set at $240.00 per month and began retroactively from November 1999 to 
reduce with each child coming of age as per Utah Code 
78-45-7. 
On December 25, 2000, the first child came of age, but lived with his mother for 
the latter portion of the school year until completion of schooling. 
On May 23, 2003 the petitioner, through her counsel, John Walsh, entered a 
Motion on an Order to Show Cause. In return, the respondent, through his counsel, Don 
Peteresen, filed a large binder as Verified Answer to the Motion on the Order to Show 
Cause on July 22, 2003 wherein he detailed by his own ledger a monthly accounting of 
alimony, child support and medical bills, along with various documentation from 
medical, dental, orthodontia and other practitioners, dating to the beginning of custody 
change in 1999. 
On February 26, 2004 and March 1,2003 a hearing on that order to show cause 
was held regarding personal property decreed to the petitioner as part of the divorce 
settlement, past due alimony, and medical bills all claimed to be owed by the respondent, 
Todd Devereaux to Sheryl Devereaux. Todd Devereaux, countered with medical bills 
and child support claimed to be owed by Sheryl Devereaux, petitioner. 
On April 14,2004 the judge's Memorandum Decision found Todd Devereaux, 
respondent/appellee in contempt of court and a judgment was entered. He was ordered to 
pay restitution for property taken, past alimony (which was reduced equitably by offset of 
her child support obligation), and legal fees accrued by petitioner to bring this action, 
totaling approximately $28,000.00. Medical bills for both parties were dismissed for 
improper submission to the opposing parent; including bills presented to the petitioner by 
the respondent for the first time in court. 
On May 11,2004 Todd Devereaux, respondent, filed a Motion for Disqualification 
of the judge on the grounds that the judge had prejudicial knowledge of the respondent 
from approximately 17 years previous to the hearing. The respondent also filed 
objections to the Findings, Order and Judgment and the Affidavit of Attorney's Fees, 
claiming the attorney for petitioner was dishonest in his fees. Also on that date, 
respondent filed a Notice of Appearance for a new attorney for himself. Gary Anderson 
replaced Don Peterson as respondent's counsel. 
On June 10,2004 judgment in favor of the petitioner/appellant for $28,552.00 
along with Contempt of Court was entered. 
On July 1, 2004 a Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel for the respondent was filed. 
Scott P. Card replaced Gary Anderson as respondent/appelee's counsel. 
On July 2, 2004 an order of Recusal and Reassignment was filed after a hearing on 
respondent/appelee's Motion for Disqualification. Judge Stott replaced Judge Taylor, 
who recused himself. 
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There is no record in the docket of a Notice of Withdrawal or Substitution of 
Counsel, but respondent's counsel was changed from Scott P. Card to Brian C. Harrison 
sometime prior to the hearing on Objection. 
On October 6,2004 a hearing on the Objection to Recommendation was held. 
Attorney for the petitioner was sworn and took the stand under examination of 
respondent's newest attorney, Brian Harrison. The issue at hand was the validity of 
petitioner's attorney fees. Seven exhibits were entered into court that day and labeled as 
defense exhibits 1 through 7. Exhibit No. 2 was the affidavit of John Walsh, the 
petitioner's attorney. Exhibit No. 3,4, and 5 were copies of letters to respondent's 
counsel from petitioner's counsel regarding problems with visitation. Exhibits 6 and 7 
were copies of the Motion for an Order to Show Cause and the Order and judgment for 
the subsequent hearing of February 26,2004 and March 1,2004. The ruling was upheld. 
The court ruled that the fees stand minus $520.00, plus new fees for this proceeding. A 
final judgment against the respondent for $30,127.65 was entered on November 5, 2004. 
On November 11,2004, payment was made in full and filed as satisfied. 
On March 15,2005 Sheryl Devereaux, petitioner/appellant, through her attorney, 
filed a petition to modify the Decree of Divorce to continue alimony equal to or above the 
duration of the marriage due to a material change in circumstances. 
On March 18, 2005 respondent, through counsel, filed an Order to Show Cause for 
past medical bills and child support. 
On April 13, 2005 a hearing was held regarding past medical bills and child 
support. 
On May 2,2005 a ruling in favor of the respondent was entered for $11,366.00. 
On May 9,2005 her attorney, John Walsh, filed a Motion to Alter or Amend 
Judgment and Request of Evidentiary Hearing for the petitioner/appellant. 
On June 7,2005 the Motion and Request were denied. 
On June 21,2005 a judgment was entered in favor of respondent/appellee. 
C. Disposition of Hearing at Issue Before the Court of Appeals 
The Ruling of the Fourth District Court in this matter was in favor of respondent 
stating that the petitioner was wrong in claiming that the issues before the court had been 
addressed previously, and that, therefore, a ruling for past child support and medical bills 
was the finding of the Court. In addition, the court ruled that instead of a 15 minute rule, 
a 20 minute rule would be ordered to be followed by the petitioner with respect to picking 
up and dropping off the two minor children, [pp. 1200, Record Index]. Following a 
Motion to Alter of Amend and a Request for Evidentiary Hearing, the court denied both 
and the order followed the ruling. 
STATEMENT OF RELATIVE FACTS 
A. Order to Show Cause February 26,2004 and March 1,2004 [pp.0975, Record Index] 
While custody of the minor children changed in November 1999, child support 
was not addressed until January 2, 2001, with a final order for child support entered on 
February 25, 2002, to begin retroactively to the start of the custody change. The court's 
memorandum and order acknowledge Sheryl Devereaux's inability to fully support 
herself; however, child support was stipulated based upon minimum wage and was set at 
$240.00 monthly to begin in December 1999, and to be reduced with each minor child 
coming of age according to Rule 78-45-7.. 
Prior to the hearing of February 26 and March 1, 2004 on petitioner's Order to 
Show Cause for Contempt of Court for failure to pay alimony, failure to pay past 
children's medical bills, and failure to surrender personal property of the petitioner, the 
respondent filed a Verified Answer in response to that Motion. In this affidavit, under 
tab No.l, the first page, Todd Devereaux lists, in his self-generated ledger the history of 
accounting for alimony he owed vs. offset child support and medical bill he claimed 
Sheryl Devereaux owed. The ledger clearly shows the start date of Dec. 1999, the first 
month of fiscal change in child support and continues through every year thereafter until 
the time of this hearing. Medical bills for children accrued while living with each parent. 
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Medical bills claimed to be owing to the respondent included, among others, orthodontia 
for the children. Both Petitioner and Respondent submitted exhibits in this proceeding. 
Each showed ledgers of accounting dating from the change of physical custody in late 
1999, which included statements by the respondent of monthly installments for 
orthodontia. Some of the bills from Todd Devereaux were not submitted to the petitioner 
prior to the hearing. The petitioner brought this case; therefore, child support paid by her 
was allocated as an offset to her claim of alimony payments. 
During the two day trial for an Order to Show Cause regarding the above on 
February 26,2004 and March 1,2004 the following testimony and evidence was given: 
Following the opening statement by John Walsh, the petitioner's counsel, Don 
Petersen, counsel for the respondent stated as a review that child support was set at $240 
a month starting in 1999 and reducing thereafter with each child coming of age [pp.10, 
11; Certified Transcript of Order to Show Cause, February 26, 2004 Session]. The 
Honorable James R. Taylor, reiterated to Don Petersen his own statement of alimony paid 
to the petitioner with an offset of child support starting at $240.00 per month and 
reducing as each child turns 18 [pp.13; Cert. Transcript, Order to Show Cause February 
26, 2004 Session]. Mr. Petersen then claimed on behalf of respondent, Todd Devereaux, 
that petitioner owed $9,295.72 in past medical bills of the minor children [ibid.]. 
During the hearing on the above Order to Show Cause brought by the petitioner in 
February 26, 2004, while cross examining Sheryl Devereaux, Don Petersen asks if Sheryl 
Devereaux had been paying any child support voluntarily from the time of custody 
change in 1999 as "offset" from alimony she claimed the respondent owed. He 
continues to verify from her that she understands that there was an order for child support 
stating, "There was an order entered on February 5th, [sic] 2001.. .and you were to pay 
child support 240 a month, isn't that correct.. .Retroactive to November 1999?" to which 
she replied that it was correct and that she never "got a vote" to pay voluntarily since the 
respondent was already taking it out of alimony by the fact that he had already stopped 
paying alimony, [pp. 103-105; Cert. Transcript, Order to Show Cause February 26, 2004 
Session]. Additionally, with respect to this same cross examination, Don Petersen asked 
Sheryl Devereaux again if she was making child support payments, voluntarily, at the 
beginning at the time the Order for child support was entered. She again replied that she 
"didn't get a vote" because Todd Devereaux was not paying alimony in order for her to 
pay child support [pp. 104, 105; ibid.]. 
Again, in the continued hearing on the Order to Show Cause of February 26,2004 
and March 1,2004 Don Petersen submits Exhibit No. 6 to the court as illustrative of 
testimony of Todd Devereaux: 
In Exhibit No. 6 respondent testifies to the alimony he claims paid to the 
petitioner, with the amount of child support owed by the petitioner as offset and the 
amount of medical bills he claims are owed as offset as well; all beginning in December 
1999. The respondent's exhibit, page 1, claims $76,500 in an alimony column from 1999 
forward; and $57,000 in a column for what he claims to have paid in alimony from that 
time forward; then columns for medical expenses including separate columns for what he 
claims the respondent owed for braces on three of the children, among other medical and 
dental bills, all from 1999 forward [pp.174: Certified Transcript, Order to Show Cause, 
March 1, 2004 Session, {pp. 0975, Record Index); and, Exhibit No. 6, {pp. 1308: Record 
Index)]. 
Again, Todd Devereaux testified that Exhibit No. 6, that the list of medical bills on 
page 2, he acknowledged in open court as being submitted to the petitioner for the first 
time in court that day [pp. 196-198 ibid. {pp. 0975, Record Index)]. 
Todd Devereaux testifies regarding Exhibit No. 8, that the medical and 
orthodontic bills listed in this exhibit were 'taken care o f on the respective dates listed 
on the ledger brought forth in court and further admits in open court that he had given 
these medical bills to Sheryl Devereaux on that day in court. The list in Exhibit No. 8 
includes, among others, medical treatment at Canyon View Medical Group for Brian, 
WalMart Vision Center for Aubrey, as well as orthodontia by Dr. Trapnell, for Aubrey, 
Brian, and Bryce Devereaux [pp.209; Certified Transcript, Order to Show Cause, March 
1, 2004 Session {pp. 0975, Record Index}, and Exhibit No. 8, pp.1308 of Record Index]. 
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After closing arguments in the above hearing, the Order to Show Cause brought by 
the petitioner, Sheryl Devereaux, February 26, 2004 and concluding March 1, 2004, the 
court made a brief summary of it's findings thus far at close of trial as: 
"The only medical bills that I can see that were ever delivered in 
accordance with the order, the best you can say is that it was done as part of 
discovery for this order to show cause. Fm no satisfied that that complies with the 
court's order, [pp.230, Ibid.; pp. 0975, Record Index]." 
"An explanation of benefits doesn't get it. A homegrown ledger of your 
own making doesn't get it. A cancelled check doesn't get it. The statute is very 
clear. It hasn't happened on either way 
"Fm not inclined to award either side the claim for medical benefits 
because neither side has complied appropriately with the court's orders. That was 
my impression, and it hasn't significantly changed [pp.231, Ibid.; pp. 0975, Ibid. 
V 
B. Order to Show Cause April 13,2005 [pp. 1194, Record Index] 
L The Honorable Anthony Schofield opened court with these remarks: 
"Fm happy to hear initially by way of proffer what it is you want me to do and then we'll 
decide where we're going to go from there [pp.3, Certified Transcript, Order to Show 
Cause, April 12,2005; pp. 1194 Record Index]." 
ii. Testimony of Todd Devereaux by and through his counsel, Brian Harrison: 
With respect to medical bills due: 
He stated that the previous Order of the Court declared that "neither party is awarded 
medical bills that are incurred prior to March 1,2004" and says that the order made clear 
the procedure for submitting medicals bills to the other parent, which required that they 
be sent within 30 days from the time the bill is paid with such proof along with a copy of 
the bill, submitted by return receipt as required coming out the hearing of February 26, 
2004 and March 1, 2004 [pp.5, Ibid.; pp. 1194 Record Index]. 
In his testimony he includes bills for orthodontia by Dr. Trapnell, for Bryce; orthodontia 
for Aubrey; Canyon View Medical Group; among others. He states that these bills were 
"handed to counsel on hearings, the last hearing we had during the summer." He testified 
that the other three sets of bills were mailed according to the previous order, by return 
receipt The respondent testified that the medical bills and child support he claimed 
owing were not part of the previous hearing of February 26 through March 1,2004 at all. 
He testified to mailing three sets of bills to the petitioner by return receipt with one 
coming back unclaimed. He sent several stacks of medical bills to Sheryl Devereaux: 
The first stack is dated July 6,2004 for 2,180.92, which were handed to counsel at the 
last hearing during the summer [pp. 5,6, Ibid; pp.1194 Minutes, Record Index; pp.1174 
Affidavit, Record Index]. The next billing he sent was for August 17 for $355.00. The 
third set of billings is for November 7th for a total of 2,148.80. But he received a return 
receipt for this mailing, dated November 10,2004. With this billing is where he started 
having problems because the petitioner refused to pick up the mail. On November 12, he 
mailed an explanation of benefits to the petitioner, which was returned "unclaimed, return 
to sender." The final set of bills dated January 19, 2005 was for $86.71. It came back 
unclaimed. In summary of the medical bills, Todd Devereaux testified that he sent four 
sets of bills to the petitioner, Sheryl Devereaux. The dates are: July 6,2004, which was 
handed to counsel to the prior hearing for $2,180.92; August 17, 2004 for $355.00, which 
was sent return receipt requested; November 7, 2004 for 2,148.80, which was sent return 
receipt requested; and January 19, 2005 for $86.71, which was sent return receipt 
requested, for a total of $4,771.43 [pp. 6-10, Ibid; pp.1194, Minutes, Record Index; pp. 
1174, Affidavit, Record Index]. In final remarks, Brain Harrison, on behalf of Todd 
Devereaux said the petitioner had two documents before her showing she has refused to 
pick up registered mail on three occasions [pp. 36, ibid]. 
When the court was presented with submission of evidence to what the petitioner 
received from the respondent by way of medical bills, return receipt, the respondent, 
through his counsel, said he had no idea if what was in the envelopes was really what she 
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received and that it wasn't consistent with what they had and that he had no idea of what 
the petitioner had put into the envelopes [pp.37 ibid.; pp.1194 Record Index.]. 
With respect to the second issue of child support, Todd Devereaux testified: 
He did not reduce Sheryl Devereaux9s alimony by $627 but by $527 per month in 
the first four months of 2004 and showed the court his bank statement showing the 
reduction to the petitioner's alimony to be only $527 per month. He said he withheld the 
alimony because he was entitled to, but said he now believed he wasn't entitled and that 
she should be given credit for $2,110. He said he told her that in his letter of November 
2004. 
He said the petitioner was ordered to pay child support at $240 per month, which 
was ordered February 25th, 2002 and retroactive to December 1999. He said the 
petitioner did not pay anything in 1999 or 2000. He testified that the petitioner owed 
$240 in 1999; $2,880 in 2000; $1,103.20 in 2004, which concurred with his filed affidavit 
with the court [pp. 4, Certified Transcript, Order to Show Cause, April 13, 2005; pp 1194 
Minutes, Record Index; and pp. 1174, Affidavit]. Additionally, he said she owed $261.20 
for April 2005. 
He said that the memorandum decision from the hearing in 2004, page 4, indicates 
that child support was not listed for the year 2000 and therefore child support was never 
addressed and "there is no documentation anywhere that shows a claim for 1999 and 
2000" child support for that hearing. "There is no place in this memorandum decision 
where it's addressed at all [pp. 27, Certified Transcript, Order to Show Cause April 13, 
2005]." With respect to the courts issue as to why if 1999 and 2000 child support offset 
was not brought up in the earlier hearing that it shouldn't be waived now, because they 
had the opportunity to address it, he testified again at the end of the hearing saying that 
the court has raised the question of prior opportunity to consider 1999 and 2000 offsets 
saying, "look at the documents, it never was an issue that was raised, it wasn't raised at 
all [pp.28 ibid.]." 
The testimony of Todd Devereaux, with respect to visitation issues he raises: 
He testified that there have been visitation problems with respect to pick up and 
drop off times. He testified, "that if the court were to adopt the 15 minute rule it would 
resolve some of these conflicts that have occurred in the past [pp.10, Ibid.; pp. 1174 
Affidavit, Record Index]" In rebuttal to Sheryl Devereaux's testimony on behalf of her 
counterclaim that the respondent is constantly messing up her visitation and on numerous 
occasions, he says that the fact that they signed an agreement in 2004 to change the 
Holiday schedule around is proof that there is no problem with visitation. 
In final remarks, Todd Devereaux testified that the petitioner has been 
"consistently characterized as being inflexible and it relates to visitation" and he had 
"placed no restrictions on visitation in the summer at all" but stated that with regard to 
this year's summer visitation by the petitioner, he had no problem, except that the 
daughter had a girls' camp during the petitioner's visitation and that the son and daughter 
both had youth conference during that time as well. 
iii. Testimony of Sheryl Devereaux, by and through her counsel, John Walsh: 
With respect to medical bills, Sheryl Devereaux testified that she didn't owe for 
medical bills addressed and resolved in the hearing of February 26,2000 and March 1, 
2004, as well as child support for the years 1999 and 2000, and paid them as offset to her 
claims, and are therefore, res judicata. Namely, the orthodontia and many other bills in 
this hearing were before the court before. The Order from the previous hearing was 
quoted before the court as, "Neither party is awarded any sum for any medical bill that 
was incurred prior to March 1st, 2004 [pp.12 Certified Transcript, Order to Show Cause 
April. 13, 2005]." 
She argued that what was not privy before the court this day was a distinction 
between bills from this hearing and those from the previous one, particularly because 
Exhibit No. 8, which was submitted to the court in 2004 showed identical bills as to this 
day's hearing, specifically bills for orthodontia by Dr. Trapnell for about $6,400, which 
the respondent was claiming in this latter hearing. She repeated testimony that these had 
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already been adjudicated. She also testified that many of the bills being addressed in this 
hearing were submitted long after and not in accordance with the rules specifically 
ordered by the court in the prior hearing and that she could represent to the court exactly 
what she received as she saved all documents in their original envelope as per counsel's 
suggestion. She testified that she never refused mail A rebuttal to respondent's second 
round of argument could not be completed to the court's time constraints. At that, 
petitioner's counsel asked if the court would submit into evidence the documents as 
pertaining bills they received as further evidence in lieu of testimony. She testified that 
the documents were everything that she received, how she received it and that nothing 
had been changed. Those documents, the only exhibits to this hearing were marked 
Exhibits No. 1 and 2 and show the following: Exhibit No. 1: The envelope postmarked 
"Sep 02, 04" had a self-generated ledger, corresponding to that of respondent in his 
affidavit, dated August 17,2004, listing Allen's Pharmacy, Wal Mart, Health South, 
Health South, and Petersen Medical, with some documentation. Exhibit No. 2: An 
envelope postmarked "Nov 08, 04" included the following self-generated ledgers; July 6, 
2004, listing Dr. Trapnell, Canyon View Medical Group, Wal Mart Vision Center, and 
some documentation; August 17, 2004, same as in Exhibit No. 1 with out supporting 
documentation; November 7, 2004, Dr. Trapnell, Dr. Dobson, and Dr. Ollerton, with 
some documentation[pp. 36,37 Ibid.; pp.1310, Record Index]. 
Sheryl Devereaux testified as to child support: 
For 1999 and 2000, those amounts were taken up in court in the previous hearing 
dated February 26, 2004 and March 1, 2004 as offset to her claims for past alimony [pp 
17, ibid.] As for January through April 2005, she testified that although she did owe for 
those four months, the respondent continued to withhold alimony so she was not able to 
pay child support. And that it wasn't fair that he withhold alimony so she wouldn't be 
able to pay her child support then take her to court on contempt and ask for attorney's 
fees. She testified that he had withheld alimony in this way before and was doing it 
again, [pp.25, ibid.]. At the same time that respondent made a motion, Sheryl Devereaux 
filed a motion and affidavit regarding his failure to pay alimony in full for the first four 
months of 2004, along with addressing visitation problems created by the respondent [pp. 
1190, 1188, Record Index]. 
Sheryl Devereaux testified regarding visitation: 
She has had numerous problems with the respondent interfering with her visitation 
on holidays, including Easter, Thanksgiving, Christmas, religious holidays, specifically 
Conference Weekend, summer vacation visitation and regular [weekly] visits, among 
others [pp. 24 Certified Transcript, Order to Show Cause April 13, 2005; pp. 1188 
Affidavit, Record Index]. Furthermore, she requested that a solution would be to have a 
third party drop off. Her attorney offered another solution, noting that it wasn't what she 
had asked for, in allowing the 15 minute rule, but with the respondent responsible for 
drop off and pick up, instead of that responsibility lying with the petitioner. She testified 
that the respondent creates alternatives for the children on her visitation in order to give 
them another choice, rather than support her visitation. 
iv. Statements of John Walsh, Counsel for Petitioner 
After respondent's counsel presented his arguments for the Order to Show Cause 
of April 13, 2005, the petitioner's counsel addressed the court with these remarks: 
Now, I had the benefit, Judge, of being counsel when this mater came on 
for hearing before Judge Taylor and was adjudicated finally through Judge Stott, 
and I know what medical bills were submitted to Judge Taylor for consideration. 
And we're seeing overlap here in what's been presented to you by what was 
presented to the court when the court made its ruling here and reduced everything 
to judgment. 
Mr. Walsh brought his copy of Exhibit No. 8, submitted by the respondent in the 
hearing of February 26,2004, and March 1, 2004, and states that wherein are the same 
bills as presented in court for the hearing at issue April 13, 2005. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
First, as a question of fact: The petitioner/appellant, Sheryl Devereaux asserts that 
clearly that the court ignored evidence by way of, memorandum decision, dated April 14, 
2004 [pp. 1017, Record Index]; Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and 
Amended Order and Judgment, dated November 5,2004 respectively [pp.1125; 1128 
respectively, Record Index], which were used as evidence making it plain error. 
Secondly, as a question of law: Appellant, Sheryl Devereaux asserts that the court 
ignored statements by the only counsel present in the previous hearing who spoke, not in 
representing his client, but as an officer of the court with a deontological obligation to the 
court. 
Thirdly, as a question of fact and a question of law: The appellant, Sheryl 
Devereaux asserts that the court misapplied the court's previous decision regarding 
medical bills, influenced by the reinterpretation and opinion of appellee's counsel who 
used rationale not included in the prior court's decision and omitted facts in the process. 
This then, leaves open a question of prejudice and plain error for review of the Court of 
Appeals. 
Fourthly, because of bias the judge mistakenly took favoritism on conflicting 
evidence that was clearly and plainly wrong and erroneous. Furthermore, the court's 
decision on medical bills was not supported by fact. 
Fifthly, as a question of law: Because the court in the latter hearing failed to 
acknowledge or understand the ruling and its basis from the previous hearing, it, in effect 
overruled the prior court's ruling and judgment. 
Sixthly, as a question of law, Sheryl Devereaux, appellant, asserts that the court 
refused her the right to address facts refuted and bring forth evidence in an evidentiary 
hearing as part full disclosure in the due process. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
EVIDENCE BY WAY MEMORANDUM DECISION, FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER WERE IGNORED 
POINT 2 
STATEMENT BY AN OFFICER OF THE COURT WITH DEONTOLOGICAL 
OBLIGATION WAS IGNORED 
Because many of these points have a cause and effect to them, one error causing another 
to come about, these points will be addressed simultaneously, as to relieve the Court of 
redundancy. 
In the ruling of the court, May 2,2005 {pp. 1200, Record Index], the court said, 
"Ms. Devereaux asserts that the alleged failure to pay in 1999 and 2000 was addressed in 
the court's ruling of April 13, 2004. She is wrong." He continues, saying that Sheryl 
Devereaux, never claimed she had paid the support at issue. This is incorrect. "The 
finding may be overturned if they are unreasonable (Layman v. Town of Price, 222P. 
599, 63 Utah 1990), unsustainable on any reasonable theory or hypothesis (see addendum 
for references), such that a reasonable person could not have found them (Restaurant 
Operators, Inc. v. Jenney, 591 A.2d 256, 128 N.H. 708), such as to result in d denial of 
justice (addendum), or resulting in misconceiving or overlooking material evidence 
(Lavey v. Lavey, 551 A.2d 692, R.I.). 
First, the petitioner did not ever say that the failure to pay was addressed in the 
previous ruling. That was the respondent's argument, when he said because there was no 
heading for 1999 and 2000 in the memorandum those years were not taken up in court. 
That is wrong thinking. Because a judge does not specifically address every detail of a 
matter in the memorandum does not mean it was not addressed in court. 
The petitioner stated that it had indeed been addressed in court and subsequently 
paid as offset. If the court had considered her testimony, and the statement by an officer 
of the court present at the prior hearing, and speaking as such to the court in the hearing 
at issue, it would had investigated the record of prior hearing March 1,2004 [pp.0975] 
and looked at the memorandum and order more carefully. 
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The matter before the court in the memorandum of April 14,2004 [pp. 1017, 
Record Index] was her alimony. The respondent had offset to her claim. The court in the 
hearing at issue, by the suggestion of respondent's counsel, referred to the list with 
respect to child support listings and erred by so doing. The listing specifically refers to 
the matter of alimony. Page 4 often referred to in the hearing, states: (heading) 
"Alimony", ".. .the Respondent has not paid alimony as ordered in the following 
amounts"; then the document itemizes alimony paid by the year—not child support. The 
court should be very familiar with protocol and should nol have been taken off track by 
the argument of the respondent. 
Additionally, child support offset was indeed addressed even in the memorandum of 
April 14, 2004. Several times during the proceeding the stipulation to the petitioner was 
stated as $240 a month retroactively to December 1999 and reducing thereafter. Even the 
respondent stated in initial opening argument of the hearing that child support had been 
stipulated as $240 a month effective retroactively to December 1999 [pp. 3-4, Certified 
Transcript, Order to Show Cause April 13, 2005; pp. 1194, Record Index] Child support 
in that amount, $240 would only have applied in the years, 1999 and 2000, as the first 
child came of age at the end of 2000. Looking at the memorandum [pp.1017, Record 
Index] and the findings [pp. 1125, Record Index], referring to "Alimony"[pp.4], and at 
"2001:" we read an assessment of alimony due and child support deducted for offset as 
$240 per month for five months, which could only have been for the months in either 
December 1999 or the year 2000, as no other year could apply to that amount. So, 
clearly, offset at issue was paid and adjudicated in the hearing of February 26,2004 and 
March 1,2004. In court proceedings and through the very documents—memorandum 
decision and findings, which the court used to make its decision, it was explicitly 
verifiable that child support for these years had indeed been offset. Because the 
documents from the prior hearing were so commonly used throughout this hearing, and 
the stipulation of $240 starting in 1999 so many time stated, Ihe court could and should 
have readily seen the evidence of previous offset either by simply looking for that amount 
in the offset or by reviewing the tape of the hearing and its exhibits so many times 
mentioned. 
Rule 14 of Rules of Evidence states that once a presumption is established it 
continues to exist and the burden falls to the party against whom the presumption 
operates (Koesling v. Basamakis, 539 P.2d 1043-Utah 1975). At the point that it is found 
this child support issue was indeed addressed previously in court and upon the documents 
of the court used in that hearing, the presumption should have fallen on behalf of 
petitioner/appellant, Sheryl Devereaux and burden to Todd Devereaux, appellee, to show 
how it is possible that this issue was not addressed previously and how he is entitled to 
award of child support already allotted. 
Of greater concern is that because the preponderance of evidence on the issue of 
past child support for 1999 and 2000 shows that it was clearly addressed in prior hearing, 
the judge at this point should have recognized elements of impeachment and even fraud 
on the part of the respondent/appellee, Todd Devereaux for bringing this action and 
asserting that it has not been addressed before, when the court documents, including 
Exhibits No. 6 and 8 of the previous trial, specifically state otherwise. Additionally, 
Todd Devereaux's testimony emphatically states in court more than five times that there 
is absolutely no time, no place, and no document ever before the court that child support 
for 1999-2000 was addressed in any way, which is flat out perjury. The court should 
have determined at this point no further evidence by respondent was relevant on the basis 
of impeachment, at best; fraud at worst, and the motion should have been dismissed. 
POINT 3 
THE COURT MISAPPLIED THE PREVIOUS DECISION OF THE COURT BY 
REINTERPRETING ITS OPINION AND OMITTING FACTS OF THAT 
DECISION FROM BIAS, PREJUDICE, OR OTHERWISE COLORING 
In the ruling in question [May 2,2005; pp.1200, Record Index] the court stated 
that respondent/appellant's primary defense to the claim of medical bills was that the 
lion's share was for "orthodontia and dental work for the children that was committed to 
and the service rendered before the March 1, 2005 cutoff that Judge Taylor ordered/9 and 
that "in fact, the order focuses on the time of payment, not the time the bill was incurred. 
That is not the fact. This is what the respondent said she was saying. The respondent 
states that Sheryl Devereaux said there wasn't any documentation or evidence of 
payment. Then says, "What they're really saying is if there's a prior bill that was 
incurred before somehow you can't make the claim [pp. 30 Certified Transcript, Order to 
Show Cause April 13, 2005]. This statement is not bom out in fact. Appellant made no 
such admission or argument. 
Her defense for the bills resubmitted to the court was again, res judicata. The 
appellant's claim was that the bulk of the bills before the court in this hearing were 
presented to the court for remedy before. Clearly the court is prejudice, swayed or 
otherwise pulled off track as shown in the ruling, when remembering what the respondent 
supposes rather than the petitioners actual argument, which has caused a reinterpretation 
of the previous ruling. 
The ruling May 2,2005 states, "In fact, however, the order focuses on the time of 
payment, not the time the bill was incurred." The order it references, however says, 
"Neither party is awarded any sum for any medical bill thatt was incurred prior to March 
1, 2004." This comes out of the memorandum decision so frequently quoted, referred to, 
and otherwise used in this hearing. It states, verbatim: 
Neither party has properly followed that Order by complying with Utah 
Code Annotated section 78-45-7.15(8) and providing the proper information 
through counsel to the other. Neither is entitled, at this point, to any further order 
for repayment or relief from those bills. 
Nowhere does the order by Judge Taylor is based upon timely payment, but the 
whole procedure. Honorable Anthony Schofield focuses his reasoning on paragraph 6 of 
the amended order of November 5,2004 [pp. 1128, Record Index], in which both parties 
are instructed to pursue re-imbursement by the other parent through the standards of 
statute and send documentation in the future by return receipt. He uses this paragraph to 
apply to the bills Todd Devereaux has submitted to the court. 
When in fact, this paragraph was specifically designed for admonishment to the 
parties to strictly follow these rules for future submission. Paragraph 6 of the Order, 
November 2004 comes out of the memorandum, April 14,2004 [pp.1017. Record Index] 
which, after precisely discussing the bills at hand, states: 
For future submissions, both parties are admonished that the statute must be 
strictly followed. A parent must provide written verification of the cost and 
payment of a medical expense to the other parent within 30 days of payment.. .[pp. 
4, Memorandum Decision, April 14, 2004; pp. 1017, Record Index] 
It is clear that the focus on the bills of the earlier hearing was on the way they 
were submitted. Clearly, they were not submitted properly, on any count, be it proof of 
payment, third party documentation or timeliness of submission. This culminated after 
what the order states in paragraph 5 that "neither party is awarded any sum for any 
medical bills that was incurred prior to March 1st, 2004". 
This is what culminated in paragraph 5 of the order (dated November 5, 2004 [pp. 
1128, Record Index]) and is the basis of the petitioner/appellant's claim of res judicata. 
The facts, through minutes, exhibits, and verified answer, show clearly that the same bills 
were submitted again to the court. The court failed to see this point, though it was explicit 
in testimony and evidence. There was no evidence of the respondent that he had not 
submitted these bills before. The memorandum of April 14,2004 makes it clear that all 
medical bills from that hearing were thrown out, without further redress because the 
partied did not follow proper procedure in submission. Neither the memorandum, nor the 
amended order state that either party is awarded a sum for any medical bills that was 
incurred prior to March 1st, 2004 unless resubmitted with new documentation. 
Hence the res judicata defense that the judge wholly missed. "Error at law requiring 
reversal may exist where the findings or conclusions are due to, or colored by, an error or 
misconception of law [see addendum]." The judge not only misunderstood the previous 
case law, but reinterpreted its findings. 
POINT 4 
CONFLICTING EVIDENCE WAS CLEARLY AND PLAINLY WRONG; AND A 
RULING CAME WITHOUT SUPPORTING FACTS 
Had the court applied fairly the evidence and given consideration not to just the 
sections of the memorandum the respondent referred to, but to the references, including 
exhibits referenced from the hearing as well, by the petitioner, the difference in evidence 
as to the bills submitted between the two hearings would haive caused a disturbing 
observation. 
Looking at the verified answer of the 2004 hearing [pp. 0939, Record Index] Todd 
Devereaux submits documentation for orthodontics with contractual agreements of month 
installments, which he represents on his self-generated ledgers to the petitioner with 
corresponding monthly payments. Todd Devereaux testified in open court in that the bills 
of March 2004 (and resubmitted in April 2005) had been paid. But in the latter hearing, 
the respondent/appellee's affidavit shows the same bills for orthodontia being paid off 
without the monthly installments, but as to appear having been paid with one check. 
Given that Exhibit No. 8 from the previous trial was used in court for the latter, the judge 
could easily have compared the two and "smelled a rat". Regardless, the main point of 
res judicata stands. But the fact that there are serious questions of conflict between the 
two sworn documents and testimony of the two hearings should and could have triggered 
a serious call of impeachment again. 
Sheryl Devereaux's second argument, brought through the exhibits entered just 
prior to recess of the April 13,2005 hearing [pp.1193 Exhibit list, Record Index], states 
that many of the remaining bills were not submitted timely. Her testimony and 
submission of evidence shows the exact bills sent in their exact envelopes, which does 
not correspond with respondent/appellee's affidavit. His affidavit does not show which 
bills were mailed with which envelopes. His affidavit cannot verify what he sent when, 
whereas, the exhibits of the petitioner show exactly what he sent when and clearly show 
he "slipped" ledgers into the second mailing she received that were already past due. A 
conflict in evidence is not binding if the findings are clearly or plainly wrong or 
erroneous [see addendum]. 
Additionally, the court's order states that Todd Devereaux mailed bills to Sheryl 
Devereaux four separate times. That is without foundation. The respondent's own 
testimony was that he attempted to send three sets of bills to the respondent and an 
additional mailing with an explanation of benefits on a son's surgery in another. The bill 
for the latter was sent in the petitioner/appellant's first mailing received in September 
2004 and is verified in Exhibit No. 1 [pp. 1193, Record Index]. The dates the court used 
do not correspond with either the respondent or the petitioner. The dates of mailing in 
the ruling and subsequent order of the court April [pp.1200, pp.1227 respectively, Record 
Index] are thus: 
Bills mailed July 6, 2004, $2,181 
Bills mailed August 17, 2004, $355 
Bills mailed November 7,2004 $2,149 
Bills mailed January 19, 2005 $87 
The fact is these are not the dates that correspond with evidence through testimony 
or exhibit/affidavit. These are the dates of the respondent/appellee's own ledgers that he 
created. The court should have recognized this as self-serving and not bona fide 
evidence. These conclusions and findings were reached from inferences that were 
erroneous, [see addendum, Rule 808 and 810 of appeal and error]. The court was clearly 
bias or mistaken in its determination, as the above does not follow any evidence. It may 
however, go to bias or prejudice by way of the fact that the respondent, through counsel 
made many remarks regarding the character and actions of the petitioner without 
foundation. These remarks go to the argument that they are self-serving. Among them 
are "she just wants to take the position she doesn't have to...," "her refusal to pick up 
mail," and "she refuses to pay child support," "it's noted on the envelope, and she refiised 
to pick it up," among others [pp. 28,8,29, 30 Certified Transcript, Order to Show Cause 
April 13, 2005; pp.1194, Record Index]. The facts stipulate that the petitioner in fact 
received two of the three mailings with bills, with the bulk in way of dollars received. 
Thus the respondent's self-serving comment, " her refusal to pick [the mail) up allows 
her to claim well I never got it and so I don't have to pay it," draws a conclusion, not 
submits evidence. Again, and without opportunity by petitioner's counsel to respond to 
the claim, for lack of time, the respondent argues that the petitioner's solution to 
communication via e-mail would be ineffective because the court "already has evidence 
that she refuses to pick up registered mail, so how [would the court] compel her to read 
an e-mail in a timely basis?", which draws a conclusion. The evidence never showed she 
refused to pick up mail. The court should and must sift through what is over zealousness 
and self-service by the parties and determine exactly what is fact without being swayed 
by conclusions, not fact. "A verdict or finding may be set aside on appeal where it is the 
result of passion, prejudice, bias, or other improper motive [see addendum, Rule 784, 
appeal and error]." 
POINT 5 
REINTERPRETAION OF THE COURT'S PREVIOUS RULING LEAD TO 
OVERRULING AND OVERTURNING THE PREVIOUS JUDGE'S RULING 
When the court did not look at the evidence, including the statement of an officer 
of the court, the prior court memorandum decision and a review of the hearing from 
whence it came, along with its the exhibits—all of which were evidence at this trial, the 
court severely changed the foregoing court ruling. In so doing is created a substantial 
error in law by ignoring rules of procedure for trial courts in overruling another ruling 
one another, and in effect reduced the previous court ruling to moot. 
If the respondent was dissatisfied with the previous 2004 ruling regarding the 
outcome of either child support offsets or dismissed medical bills, he had opportunity to 
file a motion for appeal, but chose not to do so. The ruling of the last hearing is outside 
of the jurisdiction of a district court, which can only make "appeals on informal 
adjudicative proceedings from and administrative agency proceedings," not prior rulings 
of the court in family law [utcourts.gov/court/districts/overview]. 
POINT 6 
THE RIGTHT TO DUE PROCESS FOR FULL DISCOVERY OF THE FACTS 
WAS DENIED 
The evidence presented at hearing indicated that both sides claimed a problem with 
visitation. The respondent claimed that there 6Cwere problems with pick up and drop off 
times and only implies that the petitioner is responsible without benefit of illustration 
[pplO, Certified Transcript, Order to Show Cause April 13, 2005; pp. 1194, Minutes, 
Record Index]. The respondent never directly says that it is the petitioner who causes the 
problem but suggests it with the solution of a 15-minute rule. The other evidence the 
respondent submitted with regard to visitation was a rebuttal of the petitioner's claim of 
multiple problems with most if not all of her holidays, summer visitation, and regular 
visits. The respondent/appellee noted an agreement that the parties signed with respect to 
the holiday visitation schedule as proof that there is no problem with visitation. Again, 
the court should and could have recognized the conclusion drawn with that agreement, as 
there was no testimony or other evidence that the agreement was followed, not evidence 
that that agreement had any bearing on all the other visitation issues brought by the 
petitioner/appellant's claim. There are two ways to show further evidence of the claims 
regarding visitation. One was to look at the exhibit submitted to the court previously [pp. 
1116, Record Index] wherein are three letters written by petitioner's counsel to 
respondent and his counsel regarding persistent problems she has with interference with 
ADDENDA 
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CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT §78-45-7.15 
§ 7 8 - 4 5 - 7 . 1 5 . Medical expenses 
(1) The court shall order that insurance for the medical expenses of the 
minor children be provided by a parent if it is available at a reasonable cost. 
(2) In determining which parent shall be ordered to maintain insurance for 
medical expenses, the court or administrative agency may consider the: 
(a) reasonableness of the cost; 
(b) availability of a group insurance policy; 
(c) coverage of the policy; and 
(d) preference of the custodial parent. 
(3) The order shall require each parent to share equally the out-of-pocket 
costs of the premium actually paid by a parent for the children's portion of 
insurance. 
(4) The parent who provides the insurance coverage may receive credit 
against the base child support award or recover the other parent's share of the 
children's portion of the premium. In cases in which the parent does not have 
insurance but another member of the parent 's household provides insurance 
coverage for the children, the parent may receive credit against the base child 
support award or recover the other parent 's share of the children's portion of 
the premium. 
(5) The children's portion of the premium is a per capita share of the 
premium actually paid. The premium expense for the children shall be 
calculated by dividing the premium amount by the number of persons covered 
under the policy and multiplying the result by the number of children in the 
instant case. 
(6) The order shall require each parent to share equally all reasonable and 
necessary uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and copayments, 
incurred for the dependent children. 
(7) The parent ordered to maintain insurance shall provide verification of 
coverage to the other parent, or to the Office of Recovery Services under Title 
IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., upon initial 
enrollment of the dependent children, and thereafter on or before January 2 of 
each calendar year. The parent shall notify the other parent, or the Office of 
Recovery Services under Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 
601 et seq., of any change of insurance carrier, premium, or benefits within 30 
calendar days of the date he first knew or should have known of the change. 
(8) A parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification 
of the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other parent within 30 days 
of payment. 
(9) In addition to any other sanctions provided by the court, a parent 
incurring medical expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for the 
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the burden upon the opposing party of establishing the non-existence of a presumed fact once the 
party invoking the presumption had established sufficient facts to give rise to the presumption, but 
Rule 301 as promulgated by Congress adopted a substantially different rule limiting the effect of 
presumption, not otherwise controlled by statute, to one of going forward with proof rather than 
casting the burden of proof upon the opposing party. 
Rule 14, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) provided that except for presumptions which are conclusive 
orTfrefutable, once the basic fact supporting the presumption is established "the presumption 
continues to exist and the burden of establishing the non-existence of the presumed fact is upon the 
party against whom the presumption operates " To the same effect, seeJ<oesHngj/. Basamakis^ 
539 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1975). If evidence to rebut a presumption has not been admitted, the 
presumptloiTwnr3eienfflfie outcome on the issue; if such evidence has been admitted, the 
presumption will dictate the instruction to be given the jury on how they are to resolve doubt. There 
will continue to be fact combinations which satisfy the burden of going forward with the evidence but 
which are not "presumptions" within the meaning of this rule and which therefore do not shift the 
burden of persuasion. They might best be called "permissible inferences." 
The Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) did not prohibit the application of presumptions in criminal cases. 
Presumptions in criminal cases are not treated in this rule. See Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-1-
503 (1953) or any subsequent revision of that section. Recent decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) and Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 
(1977) have given a constitutional dimension to presumptions in criminal cases. 
Subdivision (b) is comparable in substance to Rule 15, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). Utah law is 
believed to generally follow the position taken by the Uniform Rules of Evidence (1974) and the 
provisions of Article III as originally promulgated by the United States Supreme Court. See 
Presumptions in Utah: A Search for Certainty, 5 Utah L. Rev. 196 (1956). 
Rule 302. Applicability of federal law in civil actions and proceedings. 
In civil actions and proceedings, the effect of a presumption respecting a fact which is an element of 
a claim or defense as to which federal law supplies the rule of decision is determined in accordance 
with federal law. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
The text of this rule is taken from Rule 302, Uniform Rules of Evidence (1974). Presumptions in 
criminal cases are not treated in this rule. See Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-1-503 (1953) or any 
subsequent revision of that section. 
Uu\e 401. Definition of "relevant evidence." 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is 
of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence. 
Rule 406. Habit; routine practice. 
Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine practice of an organization, whether corroborated 
or not and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant to prove that the conduct of the 
person or organization on a particular occasion was in conformity wiith the habit or routine practice. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and is comparable to Rule 49, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). 
The substance of Rule 50, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) providing for the method of proof of habit 
or custom and allowing evidence in the form of opinion as well as specific instances when the 
Rule 43. Evidence. 
(a) Form. In all trials, the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court, unless otherwise 
provided by these rules, the Utah Rules of Evidence, or a statute of this state. All evidence shall be 
admitted which is admissible under the Utah Rules of Evidence or other rules adopted by the 
Supreme Court. 
(b) Evidence on motions. When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court may 
hear the matter on affidavits presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct that the 
matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions 
Rule 103. Rulings on evidence. 
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes 
evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike 
appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent 
from the context; or 
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was 
made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within which questions were 
asked. Once the court makes a definitive ruling on the record admitting or excluding evidence, either 
at or before trial, a party need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for 
appeal. 
(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may add any other or further statement which shows the 
character of the evidence, the form in which it was offered, the objection made, and the ruling 
thereon. It may direct the making of an offer in question and answer form. 
(c) Hearing of jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to 
prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the jury by any means, such as making 
statements or offers of proof or asking questions in the hearing of the jury. 
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights 
although they were not brought to the attention of the court. 
Advisory Committee Note B This rule is the federal rule, verbatim. The 2001 amendment adopts 
changes made in Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a) effective December 1, 2000. 
Rule 301. Presumptions in general in civil actions and proceedings. 
(a) Effect. In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by statute or by these rules, 
a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of proving that the 
nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence. 
(b) Inconsistent presumptions. If presumptions are inconsistent, the presumption applies that is 
founded upon weightier considerations of policy. If considerations of policy are of equal weight 
neither presumption applies. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
The text of this rule is adapted from Rule 301, Wyoming Rules of Evidence (1977), which is Rule 
301, Uniform Rules of Evidence (1974) except that the word "civil" is added in subdivision (a). Rule 
301, Federal Rules of Evidence, is a substantially different rule than that promulgated by the United 
States Supreme Court. Rule 301, as originally proposed by the United States Supreme Court, placed 
§ 784 APPEAL AND ERROR 5 C.J.S. 
Notwithstanding that the verdict or finding of 
a jury ordinarily is conclusive on appeal, the 
action of the jury is broadly subject to control of 
the appellate court,9 and the power of the jury to 
render verdicts transgressing well-established 
principles of law must be limited.10 
Inconsistency. ? 
A verdict may be overturned if it is legally or 
logically inconsistent, contradictory, or repug^ 
nant.11 The court may also attempt to reconcile 
seemingly inconsistent answers.12 
§ 785. Passion, Prejudice, or Mistake 
It has been stated that a reviewing court cannot set aside 
a verdict or jury finding unless it is the result of bias, prejudice, 
passion, corruption, or mistake. 
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11. Ind —Emerson v Markle, 539 N E 2d 35, App 4 Dist, transfer 
denied 
La—Veal v Forrest, App 1 O r , 543 So 2d 1121 
12. Colo —Fletcher v Porter, App , 754 P 2d 788 
Minn —Bogut v Jannetta, App, 410 N W 2d 451 
13. Ark—Copelm v Corter, 724 S W 2d 146, 291 Ark 218 
Colo—Maloney v Jussel, 241 P 2d 862, 125 Colo 125 
Conn —Martmo v Palladino, 123 A 2d 872, 143 Conn 547 
Fla—Loftin v Wilson, 67 So 2d 185 
111—Kahn v James Burton Co , 126 N E 2d 836, 5 111 2d 614 
Iowa—Smith v Blakesburg Savings Bank, 164 N W 762, 182 Iowa 
1190 
Me—Parker v Knox, 87 A 2d 663, 147 Me 396 
Mich—Lee v McCormick, 271 N W 579, 279 Mich 120 
Mo —Keener v Missouri Pac R Co, App , 269 S W 635 
Neb—Borcherding v Eklund, 55 N W2d 643, 156 Neb 196 
NJ—Roether v Pearson, 116 A 2d 529, 36 N J Super 465 
NY—Franklin v Marsh, 218 N Y S 155, 218 A D 220 
Ohio—Central Community Chautauqua System v Rentschler, 166 N E 
698, 31 Ohio App 525 
Okl—Parkhill Trucking Co v Hopper, 256 P 2d 810, 208 Okl 429 
Tex—Dyer v Sterett, Civ App, 248 S W 2 d 234, error refused, no 
reversible error 
Va—Director General of Railroads v Lucas, 107 S E 675, 130 Va 212 
Federal Employer's Liability Act 
Ala—Williams v Illinois Cent Gulf R Co , Civ App , 554 So 2d 437, 
certiorari quashed Ex parte Williams, 554 So 2d 440, certiorari denied 
110 S Ct 1810, 494 U S 1080, 108 L Ed 2d 941 
14. Conn—Hams v Clinton, 112 A 2d 885, 142 Conn 204 
Fla—Wheeler v Yellow Cab Co of Orlando, 66 So 2d 501 
Me—Parker v Knox, 87 A 2d 663, 147 Me 396 
Mo —Keener v Missouri Pac R Co , App , 269 S W 635 
Neb—Burge v C F Adams Co, 151 N W 949, 98 Neb 4 
N J —Vadurro v Yellow Cab Co of Camden, 73 A 2d 749, 8 N J Super 
208, affirmed 77 A 2d 459, 6 N J 102 
NY—Bergoffv Park Row Bazaar, 185 N Y S 866 
Ohio—Central Community Chautauqua System v Rentschler, 166 N E 
698, 31 Ohio App 525 
Va —Director General of Railroads v Lucas, 107 S E 675, 130 Va 212 
15. Ala—Shelton v Hacelip, 74 So 950, 199 Ala 535 
Anz—Inter-State Fidelity Buildmg & Loan Ass'n v Holhs, 17 P 2d 
1101, 41 Ariz 295 
Cal —Strosk v Howard Terminal Co , 277 P 2d 828, 129 C A 2d 797 
Conn—Nichols v Nichols, 13 A 2d 591, 126 Conn 614 
111—Fnedland v Allis Chalmers Co of Canada, 1 Dist, 511 N E 2 d 
1199, 110 111 Dec 879, 159 111 App 3d 1 
Ky —Commercial Union Assur Co v Howard, 76 S W 2d 246, 256 
Ky 363 
Miss—Montgomery Ward & Co v Windham, 17 So 2d 208, 195 Miss 
848 
Mo —Trent v Barber, App , 56 S W 2d 151 
Neb—Davis v Security Ins Co , 298 N W 687, 139 Neb 730 
N J —Harpell v Public Service Coordinated Transport, 120 A 2d 43, 20 
N J 309 
N Y—Nocero v Demtto, 208 N Y S 601, 212 A D 363 
Ohio—Toledo, C & O R R Co v Miller, 132 N E 156, 103 Ohio St 
17 
Tex—Wichita Valley Ry Co v Williams, 288 S W 425, 116 Tex 253 
16. Mo —Yarber v Connecticut Fire Ins Co , App , 10 S W 2d 95T 
N J—Harpell v Public Service Co-ordinated Transport, 120 A 2d 43, 
20 N J 309 
N Y —Convissar v Frank, 19 N Y S 2d 70, 259 A D 828 
Ohio—Hayes v Halle, 155 N E 493, 23 Ohio App 522 
Tex—Cardinal v Cardinal, Ctv App , 131 S W 2d 1005, error dis-
missed 
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appeal from a trial without a jury the appellate 
court may consider elements not considered be-
low and make its own findings.82 Some authori-
ties hold that the appellate court may weigh the 
evidence,83 and render the judgment it finds war-
ranted by the facts,84 even where the evidence is 
conflicting.85 It has also been held that the ap-
pellate court may make independent factual de-
terminations where the trial court has failed 
properly to make findings and the record con-
tains sufficient dispositive facts for decision.86 
(2) Although an appellate court has authority to make findings of fact 
under certain circumstances, it should not do so where the trial court 
has made no findings on the issue and the evidence is in conflict 
Cal —Oildale Mut Water Co v North of the River Mun Water Dist, 
5 Dist, 264 Cal Rptr 544, 215 C A 3d 1628 
82. Mich —Ginsberg v Reliable Linen Service Co , 290 N W 331, 292 
Mich 70 
Pa —Innes v School Dist of City of Nanticoke, 20 A 2d 225, 342 Pa 
433 
W Va —Westover Volunteer Fire Dept v Barker, 95 S E 2 d 807, 142 
W Va 404, rehearing denied 
83. N Y —Feiden v Feiden, 3 Dept, 542 N Y S 2d 860, 151 A D 2d 
889 
84. N Y — D C Leathers, Inc v Gelmart Industries, Inc , 3 Dept, 
509 N Y S 2d 161, 125 A D 2d 738 
85. N Y —Chopp v Welbourne & Purdy Agency, Inc , 3 Dept, 522 
N Y S 2 d 367, 135 A D 2d 958 
86. WVa—Thomas v Board of Educ of McDowell County, 383 
S E 2 d 318, 181 WVa 514 
87. Ala—Means v Holhs, 36 So 2d 486, 251 Ala 122 
Ariz—Curtis v Tromble, App, 747 P 2d 590, 155 Anz 429 
Ark—De Clerk v Spikes, 178 S W 2d 70 206 Ark 1004 
Cal—Shamblm v Brattam, 243 Cal Rptr 902, 749 P 2d 339, 44 C 3d 
474, rehearing denied 
Colo —McLauthhn v City and County of Denver, 280 P 2d 1103, 131 
Colo 22 
Conn— Vangor v Palmien, 122 A 2d 312, 143 Conn 319 
Fla—Irwin v Gilson Realty Co , 158 So 77, 117 Fla 394 
Ga—Askew v Askew, 90 S E 2 d 409, 212 Ga 46 
Hawaii—Maui Ranch Estates Owners Ass'n v Maui County, 724 P 2d 
118, 6 Haw App 414 
Idaho—Jones v Adams, 182 P 2d 963, 67 Idaho 402 
111—In re Mamage of Skinner, 1 Dist, 501 N E 2 d 311, 103 111 Dec 
290, 149 111 App 3d 788 
Ind —Smith v American Creosotmg Co , 50 N E 2d 915, 221 Ind 613 
Iowa—Dobler v Bawden, 25 N W 2d 866, 238 Iowa 76 
Kan—Oliver v Nugen, 308 P 2d 132, 180 Kan 823 
Ky—McHargue v Conrad, 227 S W2d 977, 312 Ky 434 
La—Wagner v Shannon, 156 So 289, 180 La 233 
Me—Graffam v Casco Bank & Trust Co, 16 A 2d 106, 137 Me 148 
Md—Meyers v Murphy, 28 A 2d 861, 181 Md 98 
Mass—Bodman v Martha's Vineyard Nat Bank of Tisbury, 11, 
N E 2 d 670, 330 Mass 125 
Mich—Stevenson v Aalto, 53 N W 2 d 382, 333 Mich 582 
Minn —Williams v Jayne, 299 N W 853, 210 Minn 594 
§ 801. On Conflicting Evidence In General 
Generally, findings of the trial court based on conflicting 
evidence are regarded as binding and conclusive on the appellate 
court and not to be disturbed. 
Library References 
O10111(1 , 2, 7) 
Generally, findings of the trial court based on 
conflicting evidence are regarded as binding and 
conclusive on the appellate court and not to be 
disturbed,87 at least where the findings are not 
clearly or plainly wrong or erroneous.88 
Miss—Shaw v Shaw, 194 So 751 
Mo —In Interest of R E M , App , 712 S W 2d 398 
Mont —Oberosler v Oberosler, 272 P 2d 1005, 128 Mont 140 
Neb—Capital Bridge Co v Saunders County, 83 N W 2d 18, 164 N«b 
304 
Nev —In re Katleman's Estate, 269 P 2d 257, 70 Nev 330 
N H — Dunsmore v Ralston Punna Co , 10 A 2d 665, 90 N H 470 
NJ—Fruzynski v Radler, 93 A 2d 35, 23 N J Super 274 
N M —L & B Equipment Co v McDonald, 275 P 2d 639, 58 N M 
709 
N Y—Dennerlein v Martin, 159 N E 891, 247 N Y 145 
N C —Stone v Town of Benson, 199 S E 25, 214 N C 280 
N D —Pagel v Trinity Hospital Ass'n, 6 N W 2d 392, 72 N D 262 
Ohio—McLaughlin v New York Cent R Co , 200 N E 757, 130 Ohio 
St 527 
Okl—Scott v Miller, 299 P2d 1107 
Or—Miller v Ziednch, 263 P 2d 611, 199 Or 505 
Pa—Old Furnace Coal Co v Wilson, 3 A 2d 336, 332 Pa 208 
R I —People's Sav Bank of Providence v Small, 13 A 2d 814, 65 R I 
149 
SC—Raines v Sanders, 132 S E 581, 134 S C 284 
S D —Croughan v Gerlach, 298 N W 730, 68 S D 93 
Tenn —Shuffield v Shuffield, 6 Tenn App 482 
Tex—Price v Biscoe, 170 S W 2d 729, 141 Tex 159 
Utah—Smith v Utah Cent Credit Union, 727 P 2d 219 
Vt—Reed v Hendee, 137 A 329, 100 Vt 351 
Va—Martin v Phillips, 369 S E 2 d 397, 235 Va 523 
Wash—Crowley v Mills, 287 F 2d 491, 47 Wash 2d 340 
W Va —Ross v Chesapeake & O Ry Co , 152 S E 5, 108 W Va 503 
Wis —Central Refrigeration v Monroe, 47 N W 2d 438, 259 Wis 23 
Wyo— Dollar v Allshouse, 311 P 2d 396 
88. Ala —McCool v State ex rel State of Tennessee, Civ App, 560 
So 2d 772—Beckworth v Leonard, Civ App , 554 So 2d 1043 
Anz—Gillespie Land & Irr Co v Jones, 164 P 2d 456, 63 Anz 535 
Cal —Vecki v Sorensen, 273 P 2d 908, 127 C A 2d 407 
Colo —Harlan C Stientjes, P C v Olde-Cumberlin Auctioneers, Inc, 
App, 754 P2d 1384 
Conn —Horsfall v Foley, 150 A 64, 111 Conn 722 
Fla—Smith v Clements, 154 So 520, 114 Fla 614 
Ga—Heidt v McMillan, 89 S E 718, 145 Ga 640 
111—City of Qumcy v Kemper, 136 N E 763, 304 111 303 
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Stated differently, where the trial court has 
heard conflicting evidence and considered and 
determined the weight thereof, the appellate 
court will not reexamine the question or go be-
yond the conclusions thus reached,89 or substitute 
its conclusions on the facts for those of the lower 
court,90 but will resolve any conflict in favor of 
the judgment,91 and give to the findings of the 
trial judge the greatest or utmost weight.92 
§ 802. Nature and Extent of Conflict in 
Evidence 
Library References 
Appeal and Error <s=>10111(3) 
The conflict in the evidence must be a substant ial one in 
order to have findings considered binding, but it need not 
necessarily be between the testimony of the witnesses for the 
respective parties. 
There must be a material question or dispute 
concernmg the evidentiary facts to have a con-
flict which will prevent the facts from being 
reviewed,93 and such conflict must be substantial 
and real, not fanciful or fictitious.94 The evi-
dence to create a substantial conflict must be 
such as to present a fair and reasonable ground 
for a difference of opinion.95 It is not enough 
that there is a mere scintilla of evidence which 
only furnishes ground for suspicion or conjecture 
Ind—Ruoff v Dowerman, 122 N E 361, 69 IndApp 460 
La.—Economy Auto Salvage, Inc v Allstate Ins Co , App 3 Cir, 499 
So 2d 963, writ denied 501 So 2d 199 
Md—Rutherford v Mancuso, 26 A 2d 374, 180 Md 628 
Mass—Young v Young, 129 N E 2 d 894, 333 Mass 767 
Minn —Roth v Roth, App, 406 N W 2d 77 
Miss—Shipman v Lovelace, 58 So 2d 657, 214 Miss 241, corrected 60 
So 2d 559, 215 Miss 141 
Mo—General Contract Purchase Corp 
563 
Propst, App , 239 S W 2d 
Neb —Wallace v Insurance Co of North America, 75 N W 2d 549, 162 
Neb 172 
Nev—Ormachea v Ormachea, 217 P2d 355, 67 Nev 273 
N J —Parnes v Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co , 1 A 2d 26, 
120 N J Law 517 
Ohio—Finney v Morehouse, 161 N E 293, 27 Ohio App 499 
Okl—Fabbro v Reese, 246 P2d 324, 206 Okl 655 
R I —Fine v United Plumbing & Heating Supply Co , 126 A 2d 831, 85 
R I 97 
Va—Nix v Nix, 41 S E 2 d 345, 186 Va 14 
Wash—Choukas v Carras, 81 P 2d 841, 195 Wash 659 
WVa—Gaylord v Hope Natural Gas Co , 8 S E 2 d 189, 122 W Va 
205 
Wis—Drott Tractor Co v Kehrein, 81 N W 2d 500, 275 Wis 320 
Wyo—Arnold v Jennings, 296 P 2d 989, 75 Wyo 463 
89. Ark—Parrott v Fullerton, 193 S W 2d 654, 209 Ark 1018 
Cal—Southern California Gas Co v Goss, App, 308 P 2d 41, 149 
C A 2d 339 
Colo—Mabray v Williams, 291 P2d 677, 132 Colo 523 
Conn —Central Coat, Apron & Linen Service v Indemnity Ins Co of 
North America, 70 A 2d 126, 136 Conn 234 
Idaho—Muniz v Schrader, App , 767 P 2d 1272, 115 Idaho 497 
111—Cotter v Parnsh, 5 Dist, 520 N E 2 d 1172, 117 111 Dec 821, 166 
111 App 3d 836 
Kan—Meyer v Rogers, 244 P2d 1169, 173 Kan 124 
La —T & G Salvage, Inc v Port Petroleum, Inc, App 3 Cir, 496 
So 2d 1386 
Minn-Shel l Oil Co v Kapler, 50 N W 2 d 707, 235 Minn 292 
Mo—Van Eaton v Dennis, 242 S W 2d 21 
Neb —NI Industnes, Inc v Husker-Hawkeye Distributing, Inc , 448 
N W 2 d 157,233 Neb 808 
Nev—Close v Redehus, 215 P 2d 659, 67 Nev 158 
N M —Matter of R W , App , 772 P 2d 366, 108 N M 332, certiorari 
denied 771 P 2d 981, 108 N M 273 and Williams v State ex rel 
Dept of Human Services, 771 P 2d 981, 108 N M 273 
Ohio—Crull v Maple Park Body Shop, 521 N E 2 d 1099, 36 Ohio 
App 3d 153 
Pa—Commonwealth, Dept of Transp, Bureau of Traffic Safety v 
O'Connell, 555 A 2d 873, 521 Pa 242 
S C —Holhday v City of Greenville, 78 S E 2d 279, 224 S C 207 
Tex —Neh on v Dallas Independent School Dist, App —Dallas, 774 
S W 2d 380, error denied 
Wash—In re Thacker, 214 P 2d 507, 35 Wash 2d 605 
Wyo —Hardee v Miller, 247 P 2d 149, 70 Wyo 204 
90. Ala —Pugh v Cannon, 94 So 2d 386, 266 Ala 97 
Ind—Smith v Brown, 134 N E 2 d 823, 126 N E 2 d 545 
Mich—Allen v Curner Lumber Co , 61 N W 2 d 138, 337 Mich 696 
Okl —Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co v Carter, 57 P 2d 864, 177 
Okl 1 
Or—Nelson v Cohen, 84 P2d 658, 160 Or 336 
R I —Metropolitan Life Ins Co v Sandstrand, 82 A 2d 863, 78 R I 
457 
91. Alaska—Parker v Northern Mixing Co , 756 P 2d 881 
Ariz—Im penal Litho/Graphics v M J Enterprises, App , 730 P 2d 
245, 152 Anz 68 
Cal —Kimble v Los Angeles City Bd of Educ , 2 Dist, 238 Cal Rptr 
160, 192 C A 3d 1423, review denied 
Colossale Concrete, Inc , 542 A 2d Conn —Nor'easter Group, Inc 
692, 207 Conn 468 
92. Hawaii—Hong v Kong, 683 P 2d 833, 5 Haw App 174, reconsid-
eration granted 753 P 2d 253, 5 Haw App 682 
93. Cal —Reese v Smith, 70 P 2d 933, 9 C 2d 324 
Mo — SLitofT v Solomon, App, 244 S W 2d 590 
Wash —Plaza Farmers' Union Warehouse & Elevator Co v Tomhnson, 
28 P 2d 299, 176 Wash 178 
94. Cal—Fewel & Dawes v Pratt, 109 P 2d 650, 17 C2d 85 
Brant v Retirement Board of San Francisco, 135 P 2d 396, 57 
C A 2d 721 
Idaho—Whicher v Delaware Mines Corp , 15 P 2d 610, 52 Idaho 304 
Mont — Wells-Dickey Co v Embody, 266 P 869, 82 Mont 150 
Nev— Valverde v Valverde, 26 P2d 233, 55 Nev 82 
Va—Parsons' Adm'r v Fitchett, 149 S E 817, 153 Va 295 
Wyo—Desmond v Snyder, 174 P 2d 139, 62 Wyo 478 
95. Cal —Tobias v Adams, 258 P 588, 201 C 689 
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The appellate court should give due regard to the 
(Opportunity of the trial court to judge the credi-
bility oi T¥Ve&fefcae&.lQ 
Even those authorities who hold that the appel-
late court may make its own determinations re-
garding questions of fact hold that deference 
should be given to findings of the trial court 
regarding credibility,11 and that the appellate 
court must give due regard to the opportunity of 
the trial court to judge credibility.12 
The rule that the appellate court defers to the 
trial court on matters of credibility is not abso-
lute.13 
§ 804. Grounds for Overturning Findings in 
General 
The appellate court may overturn the trial court's findings 
of fact where they are due to or colored by an error or miscon-
ception of law. 
APPEAL AND ERROR § 804 
Library References 
Appeal and Error<s=»1008, 1008.1, 1008.1(1), 1011, 1011.1, 
1011.1(1). 
^he only question or inquiry before the appel-
late court for review with reference to the fact 
findings of the trial court is whether or not they 
ar£ for some reason erroneous or wrong as a 
matter of law;14 but for such errors the findings 
ar0 subject to review and correction by the appel-
late court the same as are the findings of the 
jury-15 
The appellate court may overturn the findings 
of the trial court due to a violation of the rules of 
la\*f governing the case.16 Error at law requiring 
reversal may exist where the findings or conclu-
sions are due to, or colored by, an error fo? 
misconception of law.17 \\t 
The findings may be overturned if they ar& 
Minn.—Demning v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins., App., 411 N.W.2d 571. 
Mo.—McGuire Furniture Rental Co. v. Merta, App., 773 S.W.2d 878. 
N.Y.—Ausch v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins, Co., 2 Dept., 511 N.Y.S.2d 
919, 125 A.D.2d 43, appeal denied 516 N.E.2d 1223, 70 N.Y 2d 610, 
522N.Y.S.2d 110. 
Tenn.—Weaver v. Nelms, App., 750 S.W.2d 158. 
Utah—Sorensen v. Sorensen, App., 769 P.2d 820, affirmed in part, 
reversed in part on other grounds 839 P.2d 774. 
10. Ark.—Gosnell v. Independent Service Finance, Inc., 774 S.W.2d 
430, 28 Ark.App. 334. 
Hawaii—Maui Ranch Estates Owners Ass'n v. Maui County, 724 P.2d 
118, 6 Haw.App. 414. 
Mich.—Hawkins v. Smithson, 449 N.W.2d 676, 181 Mich App. 649. 
Minn.—Kilton v. Richard G. Nadler & Associates, App., 447 N.W.2d 
468, review denied. 
Mo.—Wooten v. DeMean, App., 788 S.W.2d 522. 
N.Y.—Clancy v. Nassau County, 2 Dept., 530 N.Y.S.2d 587, 142 
A.D.2d 626. 
N.D.—Lang v. Wonnenberg, 455 N.W.2d 832. 
S.D.—Bachand v. Walker, 455 N.W.2d 851. 
11. N.Y.—Feiden v. Feiden, 3 Dept., 542 N.Y.S.2d 860, 151 A.D.2d 
889. 
12. N.Y.—D.C. Leathers, Inc. v. Gelmart Industries, Inc., 3 Dept., 
509 N.Y.S.2d 161, 125 A.D.2d 738. 
13. Mo.—In re Estate of Thomas, App., 729 S.W.2d 42. 
Failure to articulate reasons 
When trial court's reasons do not articulate theory of evidentiary facts 
upon which conclusion is based, appellate court is unable to give finding 
usual deference attributed to decisions of triers of fact. 
La.—Thompson v. PetroUnited Terminals, Inc., App. 1 Cir., 536 So 2d 
504, writ denied 537 So.2d 212 and 537 So.2d 213. 
14. Cal.—Bowman v. Carroll, 7 P.2d 734, 120 C.A. 309 
Ga.—Thornton v. Germania Fire Ins. Co., 107 S.E. 279, 26 Ga.App. 
653. 
Ind.—Fidelity & Casuality Co of New York v. Carroll, 117 N E. 858, 
186 Ind. 633. 
Iowa—Artificial Ice Co. 
Iowa 1133. 
Reciprocal Exchange, 184 N.W. 756, 192 
Kan — Brunington v. Wagoner, 164 P. 1057, 100 Kan. 10, 439. 
Ky —Cary-Glendon Coal Co. v. Carmichael, 80 S.W.2d 29, 258 Ky. 
4U. 
Me—Ayer v. Hams, 132 A. 742, 125 Me. 249. 
Mass.-Schon v. Odd Fellows' Bldg. Ass'n, 152 N.E. 55, 255 Mass. 465. 
Mich.—Barnes v. Beck, 83 N.W.2d 228, 348 Mich. 286. 
Mo-Universal Const. Co. v. City of St. Louis, 223 S.W. 931, 284 Mo. 
89. 
N.jvl—Field v. Irvm, 279 P. 873, 34 N.M. 199. 
Okl— Simmons v. Maxey, 233 P. 669, 106 Okl. 252. 
S.C—Smith v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 100 S.E. 148, 112 S.C 462. 
S.P-—Kreger v. City of Clear Lake, 195 N.W. 498, 46 S.D. 614 
Xe?c-—International Fire Insurance Co. v. Black, Civ.App., 179 S.W. 
534, error refused 
Ut^h—Woolf v. Gray, 158 P. 788, 48 Utah 239. 
15, Ala.—Fidelity Phenix Fire Ins. Co. of New York v. Raper, 6 So.2d 
513, 242 Ala. 440. 
Iov^a—Schmidt v. Hayden, 219 N.W. 399, 205 Iowa 1369. 
N J l — Concord Steam Corp. v. City of Concord, 519 A.2d 266, 128 
rf.H. 724. 
16, Conn.—City of New Haven v. Town of Torrington, 43 A.2d 455, 
132 Conn. 194. 
Icteho—Walker v. Jackson, 279 P. 293, 48 Idaho 18. 
TeX-—Bute v. Stude, Civ.App., 264 S.W. 1037, dismissed W.O.J. 
^ n . kVfc.—X3s\%%* H • ^Sass**, ^ f^c.1& ^0*, 1^1 $ski>. V&. 
Colo.—Cole v. Christopher, 217 P.2d 620, 121 Colo. 461. 
Conn.—Rose v. Campitello, 159 A. 887, 114 Conn. 637. 
Fla— Holland v. Gross, 89 So.2d 255. 
Idaho—Clark v. Clark, 69 P.2d 980, 58 Idaho 37. 
Minn.—Honn v. Coin & Stamp Gallery, Inc., App., 407 N.W.2d 419, 
review denied. 
Mo.—Maxwell v. Dunham, 297 S.W. 94, 222 Mo.App. 193. 
N.J.—Hendee v. Wildwood, D.B. & S.L.R. Co., 97 A. 719, 89 N.J.Law 
32, affirmed 100 A. 1070, 90 N.J.Law 325. 
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unreasonable,18 unsustainable on any reasonable 
theory or hypothesis,19 such that a reasonable 
person could not have found them,20 such as to 
result in a denial of justice,21 unwarranted as a 
matter of law,22 clearly the result of passion or 
prejudice,23 the result of misconceiving or over-
looking material evidence,24 or the result of an 
abuse of discretion.25 
Furthermore, the judgment should be reversed 
if the facts found by the court, supplemented by 
those he should have found, will support a judg-
ment for appellant.26 
The mere fact that a contrary finding could 
have been made does not justify overturning a 
finding.27 Thus, the mere fact that there is a 
N.Y.—Richards v. Wood, Dolson Co., 51 N.Y.S.2d 411. 
N.C.—Van Hanford v. McSwain, 53 S.E.2d 84, 230 N.C. 229. 
Okl.—Continental Oil Co. v. Rapp, 301 P.2d 198. 
Pa.—Weir by Gasper v. Estate of Ciao, 556 A.2d 819, 521 Pa. 49 
R.I.—Smith v. Pendleton, 163 A. 738, 53 R.I. 79. 
S.C.—Simmons v. Cohen, 88 S.E.2d 679, 227 S.C. 606. 
S.D.—Johnson v. Shaver, 172 N.W. 676, 41 S.D. 585. 
Tex.—Ramsey v. Abilene Building & Loan Ass'n, Civ.App., 57 S.W.2d; 
877. 
Utah—Clotworthy v. Clyde, 265 P.2d 420, 1 UtahJd*25L 
Wis.—Truelsch v. N^rtm7«ste^^ Co., 202 N.W. 352, 186 
Wis. 239. 
Vyo.—Weidt v. Brannan Motor Co., 260 P.2d 757, 72 Wyo. 1. 
^T$r^KtK^l&v^rC®mtor2l S.W.2d K)67,~ 181 Ar£~994* " 
Cal.—Larson v. Thoresen, 254 P.2d 656, 116 C.A.2d 790. 
Conn.—Planning and Zoning Com'n of Town of Lisbon v. Desrosier, 
545 A.2d 597, 15 Conn.App. 550. 
Fla.—Parsons v. Federal Realty Corp., 143 So. 912, 105 Fla. 105. r 
111.—Van Hooser v. Fick, 63 N.E.2d 141, 326 Ill.App. 593. 
Mo.—Enterprise Furniture & Carpet Outfitting Installment Co. v. Stir 
gall, App., 206 S.W. 390. 
N.H.—Emery v. Woodward, 69 A.2d 865, 96 N.H. 61. 
Tex.—Palatine Ins. Co., Limited, of London, England v. Petrovich, 
Civ.App., 235 S.W. 929. 
Utah—Lyman v. Town of Price, 222 P. 599, 63 Utah 90. 
19. Cal.—Kuhn v. Ferry & Hensler, 206 P.2d 1, 91 C.A.2d 805. 
Ind.—Morris v. Buchanan, 44 N.E.2d 166, 220 Ind. 510. 
Minn.—Lyons v. City of Minneapolis, 63 N.W.2d 585, 241 Minn. 439. 
Mo.—St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Dillard, 43 S.W.2d 1034, 328 
Mo. 1154. 
N.M.—White v. Montoya, 126 P.2d 471, 46 N.M. 241. 
Tex.—Deanejik J)eane, Civ.App., 298 S.W.2d 282. 
" m N.H.—Restaurant Operators, Inc. v. Jenney, 519 A.2d 256, 12§% 
21. N.J.—Meshinsky v. Nichols Yacht Sales, Inc., 541 A.2d 1063, 110 
N.J. 464. 
$2. Cal.—Pewitt v. Riley, 163 P.2d 873, 27 C.2d jjlO. ^ 
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conflict in the evidence does not justify overturn-
ing a finding.28 
§ 805. Clear Error 
The fact findings of the trial judge will not ordinarily be 
disturbed if they are not clearly, plainly, palpably, or manifestly 
wrong or erroneous 
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sion, a conclusion contrary to that reached by the 
trial court.36 A finding is clearly erroneous if it 
is based on an erroneous view of the law.37 
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the finding is not clearly or manifestly errone-
ous.38 
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usually given a finding of fact.45 Facts which 
are stated in a memorandum decision will be 
accorded the same weight as if they had been 
contained In formal findings.46 Some authorities 
hold that an oral opinion by the trial court giving 
the reasons for its decision does not amount to a 
judicial finding of facts.47 
§ 808. Conclusions or Inferences from Facts 
or Undisputed Evidence 
The appellate court is not bound by the conclusions or 
inferences drawn by the trial court from the facts found, al-
though there is authority to the contrary, and will review to 
determine whether the findings made support the judgment 
rendered or the ultimate conclusion drawn. 
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conclusion drawn was erroneous or entirely un-
warranted.54 
The function of the appellate court in this 
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illogically drawn as to be wholly unjustifiable;55 
and the conclusions will not be disturbed when 
they are supported by the subordinate or subsid-
iary facts,56 or are legally inferable therefrom,57 
or unless it appears that they either involve the 
application of some erroneous rule of law materi-
al to the case or are unreasonably drawn from 
the facts found.58 
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obviously not merely deductions from other facts 
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ing not so supported is clearly erroneous.93 Evi-
dence is substantial where a reasonable person 
could consider it adequate to support the find-
ings.94 
It has also been held that findings should be 
upheld if they are sustained by evidence which 
reasonably supports or tends to support them.95 
A finding which is so supported is not clearly 
erroneous or wrong,96 although-there is authority 
to the contrary.97 A finding which is not so 
supported is clearly erroneous,98 or where the 
evidence is reasonably susceptible of different 
inferences or conclusions.99 
93. Hawaii—Maui Ranch Estates Owners Ass'n v. Maui County, 724 
P.2d 118, 6 Haw.App. 414. 
Idaho—Jensen v. Westberg, App., 772 P.2d 228, 115 Idaho 1021. 
Minn.—Warthan v. Midwest Consol. Ins. Agencies, Inc., App., 450 
N.W.2d 145. 
94. Iowa—Waukon Auto Supply v. Farmers & Merchants Sav. Bank, 
440 N.W.2d 844. 
N.M.—Kueffer v. Kueffer, 791 P.2d 461, 110 N.M. 10. 
Pa.—McDermond v. Foster, 561 A.2d 70, 127 Pa.Cmwlth. 151. 
Wash.—Bering v. Share, 721 P.2d 918, 106 Wash.2d 212, certiorari 
dismissed 107 S.Ct. 940, 479 U.S. 1050, 93 L.Ed.2d 990. 
95. Ala.—Bell v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co., 199 So. 813, 240 Ala. 
422. 
Ariz.—Imperial Litho/Graphics v. M.J. Enterprises, App., 730 P.2d 
245, 152 Ariz. 68. 
Ark.—Wilenzick v. Simon, 3 S.W.2d 297, 176 Ark. 1206. 
Cal.—Nichols v. Mitchell, 197 P.2d 550, 32 C.2d 598. 
Conn.—Rostain v. Rostain, 569 A.2d 1126, 213 Conn. 686, on remand 
1990 WL 274515, on appeal 573 A.2d 710, 214 Conn. 713. 
Idaho—Peterson v. Bell, 298 P. 379, 50 Idaho 521. 
Ill—Maton Bros. v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 191 N.E. 321, 
356 111. 584. 
Ind.—Walb Const. Co. v. Chipman, 175 N.E. 132, 202 Ind. 434. 
Iowa—Windell v. Stemhoff, 234 N.W. 795, 211 Iowa 999. 
Kan.—Lawrence Camera Shop, Inc. v. Lawrence, 296 P.2d 1059, 179 
Kan. 575. 
Ky.—Phillips v. Big Sandy Co., 35 S.W.2d 875, 237 Ky. 484. 
La.—Webster v Terrebonne Parish Council, App 1 Cir., 515 So 2d 461, 
writ denied 516 So.2d 368 
Me.—Inhabitants of Town of Owls Head v. Dodge, 121 A.2d 347, 151 
Me. 473. 
Mich.—Boyd v. Equitable Life Assur Soc. of U.S., 263 N W. 780, 274 
Mich. 1. 
Minn.—Larson v. Amundson, App., 414 N.W.2d 413. 
Mo.—Williams v. Reid, 37 S.W.2d 537. 
N.H.—Bergeron v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 75 A.2d 709, 96 
N.H. 304. 
N.M.—Hase v. Summers, 295 P. 293, 35 N.M. 274. 
N.C.—Kelly v. Kelly, 84 S.E.2d 809, 241 N.C. 146. 
Okl.—Patty v. Price, 304 P.2d 289. 
Or.—McCulloch v. Kollock, 32 P.2d 770, 147 Or. 283. 
Pa.—Bishoff v. Valley Dairy Co., 153 A. 133, 302 Pa. 125. 
S.C.—Adams v. B & D, Inc., 377 S.E.2d 315, 297 S.C. 416. 
S.D.—Libertin v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 63 N.W.2d 248, 75 
S.D. 238. 
Tex.—Tunnell v. Reeves, Com.App., 35 S.W.2d 707. 
Utah—College Irr. Co. v. Logan River & Blacksmith Fork Irr. Co., 780 
P.2d 1241. 
Vt—Harlow v. Miller, 520 A.2d 995, 147 Vt. 480. 
Wash.—Inman v W.E. Roche Fruit Co., 298 P. 342, 162 Wash. 235. 
Wyo.—Gaido v. Tysdal, 235 P.2d 741, 68 Wyo. 490. 
Reasonable mind 
Function of appellate court in reviewing sufficiency of the evidence is 
to determine whether there was credible evidence presented such that 
reasonable mind could conclude that the fact in issue was proved. 
Va.—Westmoreland Coal Co. v. Campbell, 372 S.E.2d 411, 7 Va.App. 
217. 
96. Minn.—Citizens State Bank of Hayfield v. Leth, App., 450 N.W.2d 
923. 
97. La.—Snyder v. Taylor, App. 2 Cir., 523 So.2d 1348, writ denied 
531 So.2d 267 and 531 So.2d 268, concurring opinion 532 So.2d 750. 
98. Minn.—Olson, Clough & Straumann, CPA's v. Trayne Properties, 
Inc., App., 392 N.W.2d 2. 
Manifest error 
Manifest error has been defined as finding of fact which is not 
reasonably supported by credible evidence in record. 
La.—Clifton v. Liner, App. 1 Cir., 552 So.2d 407. 
Mo.—Gronoway v. Markham, 115 S.W.2d 136, 232 Mo.App. 1118. 
Mont.—Van Voast v. Blaine County, 167 P.2d 563, 118 Mont. 375. 
N.M.—Ham v. Ellis, 76 P.2d 952, 42 N.M. 241. 
Okl.—Davidor v. Smith, 309 P.2d 272. 
Or.—State Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Bryant, 81 P.2d 116, 159 Or. 601. 
Pa.—Commonwealth ex rel. Mandell v. Mandell, 133 A.2d 235, 184 
Pa.Super. 179. 
R.I.—Grande v. Boston Mut. Life Ins. Co., 193 A. 516, 58 R.I. 502. 
S.C—Pearce-Young-Angel Co. v. Charles R. Allen, Inc., 50 S.E.2d 
698, 213 S.C. 578. 
Tenn.—Morrow v. Town of Madisonville, App., 737 S.W.2d 547. 
Tex.—Banks v. Collins, 257 S.W.2d 97, 152 Tex. 265, answer to certified 
question conformed to, Civ.App., 258 S.W.2d 348. 
Utah—Lyn v. Thompson, 184 P.2d 667, 112 Utah 24. 
Vt.—E.A. Strout Realty Agency, Inc. v. Wooster, 99 A.2d 689, 118 Vt. 
66. 
W.Va.—Sutton v. Sutton, 36 S.E.2d 608, 128 W.Va. 290. 
Wyo.—Hench v. Robinson, 291 P.2d 417, 75 Wyo. 1. 
99. Ariz.—In re Clough, 236 P. 700, 28 Ariz. 204. 
Cal.—Benton v. Sloss, 240 P.2d 575, 38 C.2d 399. 
Conn.—Katz v. Martin, 120 A.2d 826, 143 Conn. 215. 
Idaho—Silkey v. Tiegs, 5 P.2d 1049, 51 Idaho 344. 
Ind.—Louisville & N. Ry. Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co. of 
Indiana, 111 N.E. 802, 184 Ind. 531. 
Kan.—Bentley v. Keegan, 202 P. 70, 109 Kan. 762. 
Minn.—Young v. Thorpe Bros., 259 N.W. 404, 193 Minn. 576. 
Mo.—Stark v. National Council Knights and Ladies of Security, App., 
259 S.W. 522, record quashed State ex rel. National Council of 
Knights and Ladies of Security v. Allen, 269 S.W. 388, 306 Mo. 633, 
mandate conformed to 273 S.W. 133. 
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Some authorities hold that the findings should 
be upheld if they are sustained by some or any 
competent or admissible evidence.1 It has been 
held that a finding which is so supported is not 
clearly erroneous or wrong,2 although there is 
authority to the contrary.3 A finding which is 
not so supported is clearly erroneous,4 and may 
be overturned.5 
A finding will be upheld unless the evidence is 
so insufficient as to render the finding clearly 
erroneous or wrong.6 A finding will not be up-
held if the evidence is so weak as to render the 
Mont.—Stauffacher v. Great Falls Public Service Co., 43 P.2d 647, 99 
Mont. 324. 
Ohio—Casci v. Evans, 152 N.E. 764, 21 Ohio App. 288. 
Okl.—Smith v. Lindsey, 215 P. 791, 91 Okl. 8. 
S.C.—In re Hunt's Will, 99 S.E. 809, 112 S.C. 305. 
Tex.—Galveston-Houston Electric Ry. Co. v. Jewish Literary Society, 
Civ.App., 192 S.W. 324, dismissed by agreement. 
Wash.—Buff v. Davies, 170 P. 875, 100 Wash. 343. 
Wyo.—Hench v. Robinson, 291 P.2d 417, 75 Wyo. 1. 
1. Aia.—Taylor v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co., 123 So. 78, 219 Ala. 
614. 
Ariz.—Imperial Litho/Graphics v. MJ . Enterprises, App., 730 P.2d 
245, 152 Ariz. 68. 
Ark.—State to Use of Southern Finance Corporation v. Warner, 48 
S.W.2d 246, 185 Ark. 610. 
Cal.—Chard v. O'Connell, 62 P.2d 369, 7 C.2d 663. 
Colo.—People in Interest of A.J., App., 757 P.2d 1165. 
Conn.—Dwyer v. Hamre, 193 A. 207, 123 Conn. 137. 
Del.—Turner v. Vineyard, 80 A.2d 177, 7 Terry 138. 
Fla.—Marrone v. Miami Nat. Bank, App. 3 Dist., 507 So.2d 652. 
Ga.—Daniel v. Thompson, 84 S.E.2d 52, 211 Ga. 131. 
111.—Brencick v. Spencer, 5 Dist., 544 N.E.2d 91, 135 Ill.Dec. 734, 188 
Ill.App.3d 217. 
Ind.—Bradford v. Bentonville Farm Supply, Inc., App. 1 Dist., 510 
N.E.2d 745. 
Iowa—Hubbard Milling Co. v. Kempf, 1 N.W.2d 698, 231 Iowa 593. 
Kan.—Henks v. Panning, 264 P.2d 483, 175 Kan. 424. 
Ky.—Commonwealth v. Switow, 211 S.W.2d 406, 307 Ky. 432. 
Me.—Sard v. Sard, 83 A.2d 286, 147 Me. 46. 
Mass.—Piekos v. Bachand, 129 N.E.2d 890, 333 Mass. 211. 
Mich.—Chase v. Chase, 52 N.W.2d 177, 332 Mich. 439. 
Minn.—State v. Minnesota Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 15 N.W.2d 
568, 218 Minn. 229. 
Mo.—Coleman v. Kansas City, 182 S.W.2d 74, 353 Mo. 150. 
Neb.—McGuire v. Thompson, 40 N.W.2d 237, 152 Neb. 28. 
Nev.—Gault v. Grose, 155 P. 1098, 39 Nev. 274. 
N.H.—White v. Schrafft, 56 A.2d 62, 94 N.H. 467. 
N.J.—P. Brodsky & Son v. Eckel Plumbing & Heating Corp., 60 A.2d 
241, 137 NJ.Law 421. 
N.M.—Waters v. Blocksom, 258 P.2d 1135, 57 N.M. 368. 
N.Y.—Mansbacher v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 7 N.E.2d 18, 273 
N.Y. 140, reargument denied 8 N.E.2d 616, 274 N.Y. 487. 
N.C.—Kirkhart v. Saieed, 389 S.E.2d 837, 98 N.C.App. 49. 
Ohio—In re Hutson's Estate, 133 N.E.2d 347, 165 Ohio St. 115, 59 O.O. 
130. 
Okl.—Davidor v. Smith, 309 P.2d 272. 
Or.--Creager v. Berger, 775 P.2d 918, 97 Or.App. 338. 
Pa.—Nigro v. Nigro, 538 A.2d 910, 371 Pa.Super. 625. 
R.I.—Milner v. 250 Greenwood Ave. Corp., 78 A.2d 358, 78 R.I. 5. 
S.C—Cook v. Eller, App., 380 S.E.2d 853, 298 S.C. 395, writ dismissed 
394 S.E.2d 327, 302 S.C. 160. 
Tenn.—Nashville Bridge Co. v. Todd, 286 S.W.2d 861, 199 Tenn. 311. 
Tex.—Cavanaugh v. Davis, 235 S.W.2d 972, 149 Tex. 573. 
Utah—Seamons v. Andersen, 252 P.2d 209, 122 Utah 497. 
Vt.—A. Brown, Inc. v. Vermont Justin Corp., 531 A.2d 899, 148 Vt. 
192. 
Va.—Trayer v. Bristol Parking, Inc., 95 S.E.2d 224, 198 Va. 595. 
W.Va.—Green v. Henderson, 67 S.E.2d 554, 136 W.Va. 329. 
Wis.—Rhein v. Burns, 156 N.W. 138, 162 Wis. 309. 
Wyo.—Finch v. Canaday, 297 P.2d 594, 75 Wyo. 472. 
No evidence or legal sufficiency point 
(1) Trial court's judgment must be upheld in reviewing no evidence 
challenge in nonjury setting if there is any evidence which would 
support verdict or judgment. 
Tex.—State v. Arnold, 778 S.W.2d 68, on remand 793 S.W.2d 305. 
(2) If there is probative evidence, more than a scintilla, in support of 
the finding, "no evidence" point will be overruled. 
Tex.—Pontiac v. Elliott, App.—Hous. [1 Dist.], 775 S.W.2d 395, error 
denied. 
(3) Point may only be sustained when record discloses either a 
complete absence of evidence of vital fact, that court is barred by rules 
of law or evidence from giving weight to only evidence offered to prove 
a vital fact, evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere 
scintilla of evidence, or evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of 
a vital fact. 
Tex.—In Interest of A.C., App.—Fort Worth, 758 S.W.2d 390. 
2. Facts and inferences 
If record discloses either facts or reasonable inferences to support trial 
court's findings, findings are not clearly erroneous. 
Ind.—Mason v. Gohmann, App. 2 Dist., 498 N.E.2d 1344, rehearing 
denied. 
. La.-
1001. 
-McElveen v. City of New Orleans, App. 4 Cir., 553 So.2d 
4. Conn.—Buddenhagen v. Luque, 521 A.2d 221, 10 Conn.App. 41. 
N.D.—Miller Enterprises, Inc. v. Dog N' Cat Pet Centers of America, 
Inc., 447 N.W.2d 639 
Facts or inferences 
Findings of fact are clearly erroneous when record lacks any facts or 
reasonable inferences to support them. 
Ind.—Donavan v. Ivy Knoll Apartments Partnership, App. 4 Dist., 537 
N.E.2d 47. 
5. Mo.—Magnetic Collectables, Ltd. v. Action Packets, Inc., App., 779 
S.W.2d 33. 
Wash.—State, Dept. of Licensing v. Sheeks, 734 P.2d 24, 47 Wash.App. 
65, review denied 108 Wash.2d 1021. 
6. Vt.—Peckham v. Peckham, 543 A.2d 267, 149 Vt. 388. 
Plainly and palpably wrong 
Ala.—Anderson v. State Dept. of Human Resources, Civ.App., 553 
So.2d 602. 
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